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ABSTRACT 
 
Lorn Edward Hillaker: Half of the Picture: Representations of East Germany in GDR Review, 
1958-1989 
(Under the direction of Konrad Jarausch) 
 
This thesis seeks to use external self-representation of East German identity in official 
propaganda to examine how images of an idealized East Germany were instrumentalized to 
establish GDR (German Democratic Republic) legitimacy abroad.  These representations shall be 
examined through the lens of the magazine GDR Review from 1958-1989. It argues that despite 
the current impression of a relatively static, hyper-politicized, communist society, a changing 
and externally-presented aspirational identity was developed in the GDR through a mutually-
reinforcing dual-process of “defensive” counter-narrative construction and an “offensive” 
narrative of internal socialist development, both of which interacted to attempt to establish GDR 
legitimacy abroad.  These changes are best understood through a four-stage process of 
legitimation, recognition, stabilization, and crisis that reveals an externalized GDR identity 
capable of responding to changing political climates, the goals of the SED (Socialist Unity Party) 
regime, and emerging social issues in the quest for legitimacy. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
As East and West Germans mingled across the defunct Berlin Wall, editor of GDR 
Review, Lore Uhlmann, asked “Have we deceived you, our readers, our friends, those who have 
placed their hopes for socialism specifically in our country, have we willfully spread lies?”  
Uhlmann responded to herself in the special double issue of November-December 1989 with a 
resounding “No.”  However, she did admit that what was presented in GDR Review was not 
always the complete reality; instead the magazine only presented particular representations of the 
truth of GDR (German Democratic Republic) life, articles that proudly discussed building 
projects or full employment while ignoring dilapidated town centers or inefficient labor use. 1  
GDR Review, a highly pictorialized journal of external propaganda, presented only half of the 
picture, but it is a picture typical of an official exported GDR identity. 
This paper seeks to use external self-representation of East German identity in official 
propaganda to examine how images of an idealized East Germany were instrumentalized to 
establish GDR legitimacy abroad. . These representations shall be examined through the lens of 
the magazine GDR Review from 1958-1989.  The positive representation of East Germany in 
GDR Review was necessary due to the magazine’s role as cultural mouthpiece of the SED 
(Socialist Unity Party of Germany) regime. But, GDR Review, as a form of cultural diplomacy, 
still provides an intriguing look into the legitimation of the GDR. Legitimation was necessary 
because, as Gunter Minnerup wrote: “[The GDR’s] entire history since 1949 has been dominated 
by fending off the pressure emanating from its more powerful, populous, and prosperous 
                                                           
1
 Lore Uhlmann, “The GDR in Upheaval: Speaking on Our Own Behalf,” GDR Review, no. 11-12 (1989): 1. For 
brevity’s sake GDR Review articles will be abbreviated to GDR Rev., issue no. (year): page number. 
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Western neighbor.”2 Simultaneously, the socialist project itself was evolving as the early East 
Germany transformed into the self-proclaimed “real-existing” socialism of the later GDR. 
While this analysis does not seek to demonstrate the existence of an internalized identity 
or legitimacy, it examines how an official magazine, such as GDR Review, portrayed East 
Germany to the outside world.  It should be understood, however, that this particular form of 
exported identity cannot be wholly different from the reality inside the GDR. For foreign readers 
to accept the presentation of the GDR, it had to adhere to some of the versions given to them 
from other, Western, news sources.  Furthermore, slippage between the representation of the 
official version of the GDR, the lived experience, and impressions of the readers of GDR Review 
was inevitable.  This is not to say that what East Germans thought of themselves was determined 
by GDR Review, but rather that conditions within the GDR would alter the form and content of 
articles or that the magazine would present particular aspects of the GDR it felt was particularly 
attractive to its readership. Because this paper seeks to understand the evolution of a GDR 
identity in its attempts to achieve an externally-perceived, legitimate identity, it is important to 
begin the analysis with an interpretive frame for the GDR state itself. 
The three main paradigms useful for contextualizing GDR history are those that focus on 
the SED regime as dictatorial, those that focus on the experience of the “failed experiment” that 
was the GDR, and a critical hybridization.  The totalitarian paradigm, advocated initially by 
Hannah Arendt and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and later articulated by Klaus Schroeder and Eckhard 
Jesse, focused on political analyses of state power and its role in controlling everyday life.3  
                                                           
2
 Gunter Minnerup, The GDR and the German Question in the 1980s in The GDR in the 1980s, ed. Ian Wallace, vol. 
4 GDR Monitor Special Series. (Leicestershire, England: Loughborough University of Technology, 1984), 3. 
 
3
 For more information on Totalitarian perspectives on GDR historiography see Eckhard Jesse, “Die 
Totalitarismusforschung im Streit der Meinungen” in Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Eine Bilanz der 
internationalen Forschung, Eckhard Jess, ed. (Baden-Baden: NOMOS Verlagsgesselschaft, 1999), 9-40 and Klaus 
Schroeder, “Einleitung: Die DDR als politische Gesellschaft” in Geschichte und Transformation des SED-Staates: 
  3 
 
Other similar historiography has criticized the GDR for being an Unrechtstaat, a state lacking 
democratic legitimacy.4   
Directly contrary to the totalitarian position are the former East German historians who 
referred to the GDR as a “failed experiment.” These historians, who were often active in 
organizations such as the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, wrote to show GDR history in a more 
positive, and sometimes false, light instead of the simultaneous rejection of the GDR and 
glorification of the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany).  Historians such as Werner Berthold 
and Kurt Pätzold wrote to legitimate their former historiography, often written in the GDR, as 
antifascist in juxtaposition to the historians of the early FRG who had accepted National Socialist 
rule.5  Others, such as Rolf Reißig discussed long-term crises in the GDR to explain the failure of 
a noble experiment.6   
The more critical middle ground between the totalitarian dictatorship and the “failed 
experiment” paradigms contains a multitude of moderate interpretations of the GDR such as 
durchherrschte Gesellschaft, Eigen-Sinn, and “welfare dictatorship.” The concept of 
durchherrschte Gesellschaft (thoroughly-ruled society), proposed by Alf Lüdtke and later 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Beiträge und Analysen, Klaus Schroeder, ed. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), 11-26.  For the earlier 
conceptualization of totalitarian theory see Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Totalitarian Dictatorship 
and Autocracy, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965) and Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, (San Diego: Harcourt, 1994). 
 
4
 For more information on GDR historiographical debates, see Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship: Problems 
and Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR (London: Arnold, 2002). See also Dictatorship as Experience: 
Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR. Konrad H. Jarausch, ed. (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999). 
 
5
 Stephan Berger, “GDR Historiography after the End of the GDR: Debates, Renewals and the Question of What 
Remains,” in The GDR Remembered: Representations of the East German State since 1989 (Rochester, NY: 
Camden House, 2011), 270-272. 
 
6
 Rolf Reißig, “Der Umbruch in der DDR und das Scheitern des ‘realen Sozialismus’,” in Das Ende eines 
Experiments, Rolf Reißig and Gert-Joachim Glaeßner, eds. (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1991), 12. For an overview 
regarding the ideas of the “failed experiment” perspective on the GDR, see Konrad H. Jarausch, “Sich der 
Katastrophe stellen”: (Post-) Kommunistische Erklärungen für den Zusammenbruch der DRR,” in Halbherziger 
Revisionismus: Zum Postkommunistischen Geschichtsbild, Rainer Eckert and Bernd Faulenbach, eds. (München: 
Olzog Verlag, 1996), 141-152. 
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explored by Jürgen Kocka, offers a means to examine GDR history by looking at state and 
society’s interaction and the filtering down of control from party to society.7  Concepts that use 
the related frame of Eigen-Sinn (self-assertion) try to focus on how individuals in society worked 
against the typical modes of the regime in their everyday lives. 8  Modernization theory has also 
been proposed as a means of interpreting the GDR, most notably with Kocka’s concept of a 
“modern dictatorship” that seeks to contextualize the GDR within a broader framework.9 Finally, 
the term “welfare dictatorship” proposed by Konrad Jarausch seems the most useful for this 
paper. This term comes closest to capturing “the central contradiction between socialism’s 
emancipatory rhetoric and the corrupt practice of Stalinism within a single analytical category.”10 
While the bulk of the literature on GDR identity examines the issue regarding whether or not a 
separate East German identity actually existed, this paper examines a particular representation of 
identity and legitimacy through the lens of the “welfare dictatorship” concept.11  
With the understanding of the GDR as a welfare dictatorship, I have developed a 
particular methodology that combines textual and image analysis to examine representations of 
GDR identity used to create a legitimacy narrative. This interpretive methodology, known as 
“intermediality” provides the historian with an opportunity to examine both the textual and the 
                                                           
7
 Jürgen Kocka, “Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft,” in Sozialgeschichte der DDR, Hartmut Kaelbe, Jürgen Kocka, 
and Hartmut Zwahr, eds. (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1994), 547. 
 
8Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship: Prolmes and Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR (London: 
Arnold, 2002). 
 
9
 Jürgen Kocka, “A Special Kind of Modern Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-
Cultural History of the GDR. Konrad H. Jarausch, ed. (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 17-26. 
 
10
 Konrad H. Jarausch, “Care and Coercion: The GDR as Welfare Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship as Experience: 
Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR. Konrad H. Jarausch, ed. (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 60. 
 
11
 For more information on this historiographical debate see Alan Nothnage, Building the East German Myth: 
historical mythology and youth propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989 (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999) or Dietrich Orlow, “The GDR’s Failed Search for a National Identity, 1945-
1989,” German Studies Review 29, no. 3 (2006): 537-558. 
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visual to see how they relate, disagree, and reinforce each other.12  Intermediality has taken on 
many forms and definitions and does not have a wholly agreed-upon meaning.  According to 
Peter Wagner, intermediality is “a sadly neglected but vastly important subdivision of 
intertextuality” where “images can be ‘read’ like texts.”13  Others, such as Christian J. Emden 
and Gabriele Rippl offer a “minimal definition” that sees intermediality as a method that “seeks 
to stake out the space in which images and texts, visual culture and print culture, collide, refer to 
each other, and even converge.”14   The “secondary intermediality,” of Birgit Neumann and 
Martin Zierold is also promising as it concerns itself with “the interrelation of aesthetic forms, 
topics or motives between different media offers and different media systems.”15  The core of 
these various definitions is the understanding of an interaction between image and text that exists 
and is available for interpretive work.  This term offers a useful conceptual model with the 
acknowledgment that any image, text, or image/text relationship is limited in its accessibility.  
Consequently, many images in GDR Review are politically contingent distortions, but these 
distortions are altered representations of a reality that the GDR was working to create.  Thus, 
while any image/text relationship is a particular and incomplete representation, the images of 
East Germany in GDR Review can still inform the historian as to what kind of image of East 
                                                           
12
 For more on this methodology see Peter Wagner, ed., Icons, Iconotexts: Essays on Ekphrasis and Intermediality 
(New York: W. de Gruyter, 1996) and W.J.T. Mitchell, Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual 
Representation (Chicago, 1994). 
 
13
 Peter Wagner, “Introduction: Ekphrasis, Iconotexts, and Intermediality – the State(s) of the Art(s),” in Icons – 
Texts – Iconotexts: Essays on Ekphrasis and Intermediality, Peter Wagner, ed. (New York: de Gruyter, 1996), 17. 
 
14
 Christian J. Emden and Gabriele Rippl, “Introduction: Image, Text and Simulation,” in ImageScapes: Studies in 
Intermediality, Christian J. Emden and Gabriele Rippl, eds., Cultural History and Literary Imagination vol. 9 (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2010), 10. 
 
15
 Birgit Neumann and Martin Zierold, “Media as Ways of Worldmaking: Media Specific Structures and Intermedial 
Dynamics,” in Cultural Ways of Worldmaking: Media and Narratives, Vera Nünning, Ansgar Nünning, and Birgit 
Neumann, eds. (New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 106.  Here media offers refers to the actual product that is produced 
by a particular media form.  For example, a media offer of television could be a soap opera. 
  6 
 
Germany the SED wanted to export as well as depictions that may have contradicted official 
ideas of GDR legitimacy.   
Intermediality, as a method, may seem simple to many observers, but it is more complex 
due to an almost axiomatic understanding of the particular roles of images and text in 
publications. For this paper, I will borrow Jefferson Hunter’s interpretation that words “relegate” 
and “categorize” while photographs “assimilate” and “connect” in order to read these 
relationship “against the grain.” 16  An example of this sometimes ambivalent or contradictory 
relationship can be demonstrated in captions that “may provide mere information, or a context 
altogether altering the significance of the photograph it accompanies, or an untruth for the 
photograph to mock.”17 This is not a method that is useful in every part of the GDR Review, but 
will be applied where images are featured or are particularly striking; otherwise traditional 
textual analysis of narrative representations of East Germans will be used.    
Thus, when images tended to merely confirm the statements made in the accompanying 
article, this analysis turned to manipulated “truths” within text that were different from known 
historical realities in order to explore how and why these representations were altered.  This 
method, used most commonly to interpret material from the Eastern bloc during the Cold War, is 
referred to as Sovietology.  It attempts to develop a means to analyze why certain topics were 
“left undiscussed in the press and in the professional literature” and answer why these gaps or 
misrepresentations were created.18  Due to the difficulty in obtaining information from the 
                                                           
16
 Jefferson Hunter, Image and Word: The Interaction of Twentieth-Century Photographs and Texts, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 31. 
 
17
 Ibid., 1-2. 
 
18
 Alfred G. Meyer, “Politics and Methodology in Soviet Studies,” in Post-Communist Studies & Political Science: 
Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology, eds. Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. and Erik P. Hoffmann, (Boulder, San 
Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 167. For more on this method and the study of official Eastern bloc 
materials, see also Alexander J. Motyl, “The Dilemmas of Sovietology and the Labyrinth of Theory,” in Post-
  7 
 
Eastern bloc official production material, this method will be used to study GDR Review to 
explore the creation of a particular East German narrative.  
The analysis of representations of the GDR in GDR Review will be framed by a series of 
questions.  The first of these questions is: How and why does the journal’s form and content 
change over time? A common assertion among historians is that an ossified gerontocratic society 
lacked any kind of legitimate change in the GDR and this paper shall challenge that claim. Next: 
What were the goals of the journal and how were the representations of East Germans and East 
German society mobilized to meet these objectives? The Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands (SED – the ruling communist party in East Germany) had particular goals for their 
external image that evolved over time.  Third: What do these changes over time and goals tell us 
about the evolution of GDR legitimacy beyond simple propagandistic claims?  While it is 
somewhat easy to dismiss a propaganda journal such as the GDR Review as a mouthpiece for a 
defunct and ideologically uninteresting regime, there was an important connection between the 
shift in message about East German identity and the goals inherent in doing so that reflected 
broader changes within the GDR itself. 
 In answer to these questions I propose the thesis: Despite the current impression of a 
relatively static, hyper-politicized, communist society, a changing and externally-presented 
aspirational identity was developed in the GDR through a mutually-reinforcing dual-process of 
“defensive” counter-narrative construction and an “offensive” narrative of internal socialist 
development, both of which interacted to attempt to establish GDR legitimacy abroad.  These 
changes are best understood through a four-stage process of legitimation, recognition, 
stabilization, and crisis that reveals an externalized GDR identity capable of responding to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Communist Studies & Political Science: Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology, eds. Frederic J. Fleron, 
Jr. and Erik P. Hoffmann, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 77-104. 
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changing political climates, the goals of the SED regime, and emerging social issues in the quest 
for legitimacy. There, of course, remains a degree of thematic continuity throughout the journal’s 
development, but this model best encapsulates broad changes in emphasis if not always directly 
in content.   
9 
 
Chapter 2 Presentation and Form 
 GDR Review was produced monthly from 1956-1990 first by the Gesellschaft für 
Kulturelle Verbindungen mit dem Ausland (Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries) until 1962 and then by the League of the German Democratic Republic for Friendship 
Among the Peoples.  It was published in nine languages by 
the end of its production (Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, 
French, German, Greek, Italian, and Swedish). Each issue 
was published with a large photograph on the front cover 
that most often included smiling East Germans and images 
of collectible stamps on back and included a wide variety 
of images portraying East Germany abroad.19 For example, 
the images portrayed within this section were a sampling 
of GDR Review through its duration chosen to show the 
development of color and some typical techniques and 
stylization.20 The purpose of the magazine is, of necessity, somewhat speculative, but the 
foundation date of 1956, and lack of clear prior iterations of the magazine, implies several 
                                                           
19
 For more on the phenomenon of smiling, happy communists in East German photography, see Karl Gernot 
Kuehn, Caught: The Art of Photography in the German Democratic Republic. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997). 
 
20
 The first of these is a typical cover from October 1950 demonstrating the common “smiling East Germans” trope, 
the next is from a youth festival pictured in the January 1972 edition and shows the youth focus of the journal that 
emerged in the 1970s in particular.  The final photograph in this section was in an earlier edition of the GDR 
Review, from April 1961, showing the 5th Party Congress of the SED and celebrating the victory of Socialism in the 
GDR.  Other photographs within this paper will be placed near their cited references for better understanding. 
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possible reasons for the creation of GDR Review. For instance, it could have been an attempt to 
regain international favor, particularly with leftist sympathizing intellectuals that had become 
disillusioned with the violent repression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Also, it could have 
been a response to the Hallstein Doctrine of 1955 that stated the FRG would cease diplomatic 
relations with a state that recognized the GDR. To examine this purpose more closely, the 
publishers should be discussed. 
 The best way to interpret this magazine would be as an example of Cold War cultural 
diplomacy.  According to Manuela Aguilar, cultural diplomacy is “the way a government 
portrays its country to another country’s people in order to achieve certain foreign policy 
goals.”21  Cultural diplomacy also aims largely to change public attitudes abroad rather than 
interact directly with national governments, which have more official channels.  To achieve this, 
states produce material that “tries to instill sympathy and understanding of the goals of a 
country’s domestic and foreign political actions and disseminates information for this purpose 
about all aspects of its life.”22  Cultural diplomacy can often be interpreted as propaganda, but 
there is an important distinction in that there is some room where “the desires, the lines of policy, 
the targets, and the very definition of state interests become blurred and multiply.”23  This is not 
to say that a production such as GDR Review was not a propaganda piece or was not 
representative of the GDR’s goals, but it does show that there was room for change over time in 
GDR ideas and individual action within these materials.  The institution that produces the 
                                                           
21
 Manuela Aguilar, Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German-American Relations, 1955-1968, (New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing, 1996), 8. 
 
22
 Ibid., 8. 
 
23
 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “What Are We Searching For? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents and the State,” in 
Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, eds. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, (New York, Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2010), 10. 
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diplomatic material can inform the researcher about particular goals and trends in the production 
of the journal. 
The Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries was founded in 1952 with 
their stated goal “to spread the truth about life in the German Democratic Republic throughout 
the world.”24 These goals of the original publishing organization for the journal were consistent 
with the stated goals of GDR Review.  For instance, in a celebration of the third anniversary of 
the founding of the magazine, an article stated that the authors of GDR Review have worked to 
“give you a picture of the new democratic Germany and so build a bridge to you, to the people 
all over the world.”25  Furthermore, 
GDR Review was founded as a press 
organ working towards peace and 
through this they hoped to “have helped 
win new friends for the GDR” and 
“succeed in contributing towards the 
peaceful sleep of children 
everywhere.”26  
The League of the German Democratic Republic for Friendship Among the Peoples was 
founded on December 15, 1961 in Berlin as an organization to foster international friendship.  
According to the speech of its President, Phillip Daub, at its inauguration, the League had 
become necessary because “the time had, however, come to intensify support for the aims of 
these and other bodies in the GDR devoted to the cause of friendship and cultural relations with 
                                                           
24
 GDR Rev., VI, 1959, 43. 
 
25
 GDR Rev., VII, 1959, IFC (Inside Front Cover). 
 
26
 GDR Rev., I, 1960, IFC. 
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foreign countries, in the interests of deepening and extending such contacts.”27  The League was 
designed to foster peace, coordinate friendship societies and inform other nations of the 
“character of the GDR as a peaceloving and sovereign state” and on its “socialist achievements 
and cultural and economic development.”28 The need to win new friends and inform readers on 
“true” conditions in the GDR was essential for counter-narrative construction. This can be seen 
in letters received by the magazine throughout its existence stating that they had not heard of life 
in the GDR in this way.  For example, in September 1967 a reader from India stated that the 
image of the GDR he had received from Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) publications had 
shown poverty, no freedom, and a lower standard of living.29  Thus, it is likely that the magazine 
was an effort to achieve legitimacy and sympathy in the international scene counter to its 
depictions in Western productions. These particular themes remained somewhat constant, at least 
broadly. For example, in March 1989, GDR Review claimed that their friendship societies were 
so successful due to the GDR’s advocacy for peace, the “legacy of the antifascist resistance 
struggle, and “stable political, economic and social development.”30  Thus, the dual-process of 
narrative construction is evident in discussions of antifascism which worked as a core 
“defensive” legitimizing factor in much of the GDR’s development while East Germany 
gradually built and modified socialist society in an “offensive” narrative. 
In GDR Review, as in many state-run propaganda magazines, censorship was 
omnipresent. According to Susann Kowatsch, a former employee, the magazine was subjected to 
censorship by the editorial board and the ZK der SED Abteilung Agitation und Propaganda 
                                                           
27
 GDR Rev., I, 1962, UP (unpaginated). 
 
28
 Ibid., UP. 
 
29
 GDR Rev., IX, 1967, 25. 
 
30
 GDR Rev., III, 1989, 18. 
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(Central Committee of the SED Agitation and Propaganda Department).31  Interestingly, the 
issue of state control was discussed in the journal where it was stated that all press in the GDR 
was run by publicly owned publishing houses and differed from their western counterparts due to 
their coordinated correspondence and relationship with the masses.32 GDR Review defended its 
truth claims from the inevitable skepticism in the question “can there be anything better than to 
fight for the truth? For truth leads to understanding…that is the aim of every word which appears 
in GDR Review.”33  Censorship was addressed directly later, with the statement that there was no 
censorship in the GDR, but that “the owners of the Press, the people, watch out that this true 
freedom of the Press is not misused by anybody for war propaganda or the spreading of racial 
hatred and the like.”34 These restrictions, however, “should not be confused with a Press 
censorship.”35 It is likely that, given the degree of emphasis in this article, and GDR Review’s 
focus on providing a “truth” claim to “reality” in the GDR, this article reflected a large degree of 
self-consciousness for journalistic integrity and the importance of maintaining its illusion for 
public consumption. Furthermore, given the fact that many articles were written considering 
travels to the West (which required that one belong to the Reisekader36) between Friendship 
Societies, it is likely that the contributors to the magazine were considered reliable by the regime 
and conducted a significant amount of self-censorship as well.   
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The format of the magazine changed over time, likely reflecting attempts to garner 
greater interest.  For instance, the magazines varied in length over its duration, but after an 
expansion of both size and page numbers in 
1960, they typically were around 62-65 pages, 
except for the occasional double issues or end-
of-year specials which could be approximately 
80 pages and 30 pages, respectively. The use 
of color steadily increased over time in the 
magazine, with color sometimes used as a tool 
to present favorable images of GDR citizens while making Americans and West Germans more 
ominous in black and white.  The paper was, for the most part, very high quality and glossy 
throughout its production with numerous photographs and illustrations.  Black and white 
supplements were often printed in the journal with titles such as “News and Views” that 
provided more typical newspaper stories and often included articles from press productions from 
socialist sympathizing western newspapers and Neues Deutschland.   
In the absence of concrete subscription information, the targeted audience can only be 
guessed.  The best information on this topic can be obtained from the various letters sent to the 
article series “International Mail Call” and “Mail Bag” that most often included letters from 
students, academics, and political activists.  Thus, leftist sympathizers in Western nations were 
the primary targeted audience for GDR Review, but they were most often of Scandinavian, 
French, British, or Southeast Asian origin.  The English version of the GDR Review spelled 
words in their “British-English” forms and emphasized reader interaction from the British Isles 
and Dominion, thus indicating a focus on a non-American, English-speaking audience.  The 
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particular emphasis of GDR Review on relationships with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru was clear in the early stages of the magazine.  Furthermore, several academics from the 
United States and sometimes West Germany wrote articles for the magazine, while Labour 
Members of Parliament in the British government submitted letters and opinions. This would 
match the traditional pattern of cultural diplomacy according to Manuela Aguilar, who stated that 
the typical audiences for materials such as this would be “multipliers, such as journalists, 
politicians, publishers, university professors, and others, who influence larger audiences and thus 
multiply the effects of information work.”37  More concretely, these audience members, when 
not obtaining free copies from embassies or libraries were charged nominal subscription fees that 
changed over time from their original price in 1958 which was $0.14 an issue or $1.50 for a year 
in the US to $ .80 for a single copy in the US or $8, $14, or $18 for one to three years, 
respectively in the 1980s.  Circulation figures have been difficult to verify, but according to an 
interview of Kowatsch, the circulation of the magazine was 850,000 per year towards the end of 
its production. 38      
 The organization of contents varied in each issue relevant to the topics being discussed, 
current events, and time period.  Structure was one of the more variable aspects of the journal in 
that some article series would continue for some time and then disappear and, occasionally be 
resurrected.  Some consistent overall themes in GDR Review were the use of foreign authors and 
the importance of reader interaction.  The use of foreign authors varied over time, but included 
them writing articles, being interviewed, or simply writing a brief letter to the magazine.  This 
was likely designed to bolster the “truth” claim of the journal as foreign observers would be 
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considered less likely to deceive in their analysis.  Of course, this was not always the case.  
Instead, these articles very often presented extreme viewpoints the Socialist Unity Party agreed 
with, but hesitated to present officially.  That being said, it is also very possible that these letters 
were either edited versions of actual reader letters, or were, in fact entirely created by the GDR 
Review for a particular purpose.  Interaction varied in form, including editors calling for more 
letters from readers to article series where readers were invited to comment on particular issues, 
and articles dedicated to answering common reader questions such as “Are there political parties 
in the GDR?”  There were also several sections dedicated to questions sent to GDR citizens from 
abroad and interviews of travelers to the GDR (from the various Friendship Societies - state 
organizations working to develop international cooperation) demonstrating a commitment to the 
internationalization of the GDR as a peaceful and friendly state.  Interestingly, reader interaction, 
heavily emphasized for much of the journal’s existence, began a gradual disappearance from the 
early 1970s.   
 Unsurprisingly, the magazine was largely ideological in nature throughout its existence.  
The targeted themes changed over time, but tended to maintain similar messages, if often with 
slightly different core objectives.  Consequently, GDR Review can, as Henry Krisch argued 
regarding GDR foreign policy, be seen “as a policy instrument employed to secure the existence 
and development of the GDR, to obtain for it an accepted place in the community of states, and 
to preserve an international environment favorable to its interests.”39  GDR Review represented 
much of the official line of the SED, the ruling Communist Party of the GDR, and, as such, it 
both muted and amplified various themes within its production.  For example, there was only 
vague reference made regarding the East German workers uprising of June 1953 as a western 
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plot, the troubles in Poland in the early 1980s as exploitations of Western media and only 
complimentary references to the Soviet Union and their stabilizing force in Afghanistan.  
However, as was stated before, the representations of the GDR were not frozen in time, but were 
responsive to international conditions and periods of relative internal thaw in the GDR.  Finally, 
the most important component to comprehending the nature of GDR Review is the understanding 
that comparison to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was, when not explicit, at least 
implicit in the production of the magazine.  The counter-narrative of East Germany developed 
over the periods of its existence and, operating in tandem with an evolving socialism, reflected a 
shift over time from legitimation to recognition, then stabilization, and finally crisis, but all with 
the goal of portraying a state that could be interpreted as legitimate.
18 
 
Chapter 3 Legitimation in the first decade of the German Democratic Republic, 1958-1960 
 The GDR had to address extreme challenges to its legitimacy early in its existence.  
Faced with the creation of a new state with an entirely new system of government, as well as a 
diametrically opposed neighbor (the Federal Republic), the time period from 1958-1960 showed 
the GDR as it attempted to build up an impression of a Rechtstaat, a legitimate state, despite 
these challenges. It attempted to do so through the moral foundation of antifascism, the building 
of a socialist, “superior” state, portraying the GDR as a ‘normal’ state, and providing adequate 
responses to the “German question.”  All four of these themes are dominant throughout the years 
in this period and through a variety of articles and messages, they advanced a narrative of the 
GDR that they considered not only more accurate than Western ideas, but also less biased. 
Antifascism in the GDR referred to the legacy of resistance to National Socialism 
conducted by communists and some others under communist leadership. The victims of the 
Third Reich were often blanketed under the term “victims of fascism” where resisters were 
antifascists (including many of the major leaders such as Erich Honecker - the later leader of the 
SED and the GDR).  The importance of an antifascist narrative can be seen in Alan Nothnagle’s 
argument that “the myth of the GDR’s ‘antifascist legacy’ was the raison d’etre of both the Party 
and the state from beginning to end.”40  Similarly, Jarausch argued that “such debates about 
fascism were never just about the past but also about the present” and antifascism “was 
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instrumentalized from the start to justify the role of the new communist elite.”41  The three main 
uses of antifascism in GDR Review during the foundational period of the journal were to discuss 
the cleansing of fascism in the GDR, the powerful remnants of nazism in the FRG, and what 
these dual legacies meant moving forward for these two states. 
The antifascist denazification representations of this period highlighted the earlier 
attempted excision of all fascist elements in GDR society.42 The antifascism of the GDR was 
commemorated through a variety of programs, including a focus on remembering the heroes of 
the antifascist resistance and a redefinition of the understanding of the legacy of fascism. For 
example, the citizens of the GDR more broadly were shown to reject fascism in Obersdorf where 
East German ski jumpers refused to participate in a competition’s awards ceremony (despite 
winning) when the band played the old German anthem “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,” 
“that ominous hymn with its associations of rapine and murder committed by the Hitler 
regime.”43 During this time, the divergence between the two Germanys on the question of 
antifascism was even further demonstrated when young people from Essen (FRG) and Halle 
(GDR) were asked “Who was Hitler?.”  When FRG respondents could only weakly identify him 
as a conqueror in Germany’s past while GDR respondents regarded him as the representative of 
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capitalist and militarist interests, the divergence between the two group’s narratives of German 
history became clear.44   
While the GDR claimed to have cleansed itself of Nazism much earlier through large-
scale purges, in 1958 the FRG was shown in GDR Review to be making disturbing returns to a 
fascist legacy.  For example, in February 1958 GDR Review began their long running campaign 
“Let us turn the Baltic into a sea of peace.”  In this series, the GDR’s peaceful motives of 
cooperation and trade were juxtaposed with the revanchist FRG whose naval commander, held 
up Nazi Admirals Dönitz and Raeder as idols in watching their “flank” in the Baltic.45  More 
disturbingly, an article titled “SS comeback” stated that “twelve out of twenty-one party officials 
in the neo-fascist West German ‘Refugee’ Party…are former SS men.”46  Thus, despite their 
claims to denazification, the FRG was shown to have maintained fascist figures in power, or at 
least to idolize former fascists.  
Antifascism was more than simply a legacy to be honored, but was a way of life 
exemplified in the emerging split between the FRG and the GDR.  For example, the militaries of 
the FRG and the GDR were a source of constant comparison.  As troops in the West German 
Bundeswehr enjoyed “the old nazi hate songs threatening the world with death and destruction” a 
“new kind of song is heard from the other half of Germany.”47 Here, the suave-looking GDR 
Minister of National Defense and former worker, Willi Stoph was juxtaposed with General 
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Heusinger, the former Nazi general48, to show that they worked at conflicting aims of peaceful 
coexistence and revanchist war, respectively.  Similarly, in the highly emphasized Baltic Week 
campaigns, the GDR Baltic Week was said to be entirely different from the Kiel Week of the 
FRG because the GDR’s goals were not to disguise “the aggressive aims and intentions of the 
German imperialists.”49  Most importantly, GDR Review confronted the concentration camp 
legacy of the Nazi period through discussions of camps such as Buchenwald, the “Camp of 
Horror, Citadel of Hope,” where antifascists resisted and survived terrible conditions to emerge 
triumphant.  Furthermore, the memorial and monuments were shown with dramatic images of 
space for 50,000 antifascists who would later come to “learn from the sufferings, from the 
solidarity and the ultimate triumph of the fighters of Buchenwald.”50  Thus antifascists and, most 
notably, communists had survived the terrors of Buchenwald and had risen to found the GDR as 
a German state that had renounced its fascist legacy and now worked to challenge the supposedly 
resurgent Nazism of the FRG. 
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Of course, this challenge to the FRG could only exist from a strong state based on the 
formerly repressed socialist ideology of antifascists and Soviet liberators.  To that end, GDR 
Review worked to present the GDR as a state experiencing a surge of rebuilding, economic 
growth, and generous social welfare programs.  Given the destruction of the Second World War 
in Germany, the GDR existed in a rather dire economic situation. And, when faced with the 
Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) of the FRG, GDR propaganda worked to redefine the 
standards of progress that were focused on merely material advancement and to demonstrate a 
moral superiority as their economy worked desperately to compete. 
For many years after the end of the Second World War, rebuilding the GDR’s cities and 
housing remained a major task.  The city of Dresden was used as a particular example of the 
rebuilding process as it was advertised as a “City with a Future.”  The city was shown with 
comparison photos of Dresden on February 13, 
1945 after its bombing (clearly connected with 
Western allied bombing campaigns) and then 
with newly reconstructed parts of the city such 
as the Altmarkt and the Dresden Zwinger 
Gallery of Art.  This reconstruction was 
focused on two core issues: “to give the city a 
living centre” and “to provide a maximum 
number of dwellings.”51  These dual goals were also reinforced by articles later about Berlin’s 
need to create a city center that would “be socialist in character yet retaining the typical classicist 
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elements of a great architectural past.”52  The importance of housing was never ignored; instead 
it was presented as an issue from the past, a problem “through no fault of the government.”53  
The “Young Couple Urgently Requires Flat” article showed images of cooperative workers, 
homes, debris, and very dull prefabricated housing projects that subverted the triumphalist tone 
to the construction of a glorious new, socialist existence in the GDR even while the text worked 
to have enough truth to appeal as propaganda.54  These representations of a rebuilding process 
worked to re-situate a still-recovering East Germany in a positive light and to refocus the 
benefits of recovery from the FRG to the GDR. 
The economic development of the GDR in the late 1950s was steadily accelerating, but 
was shown constantly in comparison with the FRG.  For instance, the reconstruction plans and 
work on housing for the citizens of the GDR were a component of the development of the GDR 
economy and the contested “Genuine Economic Miracle” that the GDR used as a counter-
narrative to the much better known Western economic success.55 At the Fifth Congress of the 
SED, the main “economic task” was to overtake the FRG in per capita consumption of food and 
consumer goods.56  The economic viability of the GDR was reinforced when it was acclaimed as 
the fifth most important economy in Europe despite the difficulties of the still unclear German 
reunification question.57  All of these assertions, however, came with the understanding that the 
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FRG remained superior to the GDR in economic development.  To establish legitimacy, then, the 
GDR worked to emphasize the other aspect of constructing socialism, the welfare state. 
The construction of socialism in the GDR involved both the literal building of basic state 
infrastructure, factories, and homes, but also the necessary apparatuses for a modern socialist 
welfare state including education, healthcare, and equality.  For instance, the issue of healthcare 
was addressed in the article “Man’s Health the Primary Concern of the State,” where the GDR 
advertised their national health service.  The redesign of medical care in the GDR included the 
division of specialists, increased availability of health care in regional polyclinics, free 
inoculation, and more access to medical education.58  The emphasis on education was rooted in 
the idea that “the building up of a socialist order of society is unthinkable without the existence 
of a socialist school.”59 As such, students received an education rooted in science and technology 
and by ideologically reliable teachers.  The youth focus originated in the GDR with prenatal care 
and then state assistance to the parents through free health care and state grants of 1,000 Marks 
for a new baby.60  Finally, women were also addressed as part of the socialist emancipatory 
rhetoric because they obtained equal rights in Article 7 of the GDR Constitution and were said to 
have obtained “real” equality due to their 43.5 percent employment rate.61 The reconstruction of 
society and the emphasis on a comprehensive social welfare program for its population, 
demonstrated the GDR’s commitment to developing a counter-narrative as a state that was not 
only legitimate, but also was not the dictatorial, Soviet-occupied, Cold War outpost of Western 
propaganda. 
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To present the GDR as a legitimate state, GDR Review first had to confront Western 
impressions of a destitute, oppressed people that lacked freedom.  To do this, a series of articles 
were released about political parties, the dominance of the Soviet Union and religious freedom in 
the GDR.  Taken together, they represented a series of answers to many reader’s questions – or 
were at least framed in this manner – developed to legitimize the state in opposition to Western 
propaganda. 
Political plurality, the independence of the GDR, and religious freedom all make sense in 
the context of denigrating Western views of Communism during the Cold War.  Firstly, the 
dominance of Communist Parties in the Eastern bloc was a widely held assumption.  To combat 
this monolithic image, GDR Review issued a series of articles detailing the various political 
parties that they claimed represented particular classes in the GDR.  There was an 
acknowledgment of the leading role of the SED, but only as a part of a cohesive national front of 
five political parties that agreed “on all basic issues.”62  Similarly, the political independence of 
the GDR was questioned by those who viewed it as a satellite of the USSR.  To combat this, 
GDR Review contained articles ridiculing those that thought only Russian plays were allowed in 
East Germany63 or articles with images of East German women fondly bidding Soviet soldiers 
farewell.64 Of course, these very denials indicated a degree of insecurity within the GDR about 
their legitimacy as an independent and free state.   
The question of religious freedom was particularly acute in the GDR as GDR Review 
stated “our state recognizes the principle of unrestricted freedom of conscience and religious 
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belief.”65  This was likely in response to international concern over the Jugendweihe the “secular 
alternative to church confirmation” in 1954 that worked to supplant the church’s alternative 
cultural perspectives among young people.66 Later, a particular accommodation with the 
churches in the GDR was made with the Church Communique of July 21, 1958 that “the Church 
stands in every way for peace amongst nations” and mandated that “in accord with their religious 
beliefs, Christians fulfill their legally laid-down civic responsibilities.”67 The importance of the 
basic legitimacy of the GDR, as defined by Western standards cannot be understood without the 
context of the German question and the possibility of reunification which could undermine the 
antifascist legacy, the construction of socialism, and, in fact, the GDR itself. 
In this context, the German question involved the split between the two Germanys, the 
Cold War context, and the potential for reunification.  The German question was so pressing for 
GDR legitimacy because the FRG claimed to represent all of Germany.  On its face, this was 
viewed as a threat to the GDR not only on rhetorical antifascist grounds, but on an existential 
level.  Thus, when proposing reunification, East Germany set up very clear restrictions such as “a 
reunified Germany must be a democratic, peacable [sic] and sovereign state” with the 
progressive societal elements of workers and peasants in economic control.68 In other words, 
Germany could only be reunited on East German, communist, terms. These requirements also 
made it simple for the GDR to portray an intransigent West unwilling to reunify Germany.  For 
example, Konrad Adenauer was blamed for stalling negotiations to unify Germany due to his 
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refusal to recognize East Germany.69  This essential step was a frequent stumbling point, as was 
seen in 1960 when GDR Review 
published an article “11 years of 
Struggle for German Unity” stating 
that only “on the basis of a contract 
grounded in international law, any 
relationship of domination by the 
one German state over the other 
would be excluded.”70   In this article, the Bonn government was depicted as too focused on 
rearmament to meet with the GDR and that the “free elections” proposed by the West would be a 
simple sham due to the ostensible coercive power of capitalist interference with what should be a 
truly democratic process. In this instance, GDR Review was certainly fighting an uphill battle.  
The somewhat thin justification of capitalist interference was particularly difficult for the West 
to swallow because free elections formed the basis of their political system and beliefs.  
Simultaneous with discussion of the possibility of reunification (and its impossibility) was 
another theme in GDR Review about the superiority of life in the GDR as opposed to the FRG. 
Having lost, at least in the short term, the economic battle with the West, East Germany 
worked to establish itself as superior in quality of life.  First of all, cultural achievements, such as 
the work of Bertolt Brecht were heavily emphasized in juxtaposition to vapid Western 
consumerism.71  Then, to counter the omnipresent image of East Germans fleeing to the West, 
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GDR Review attempted to flip the narrative by first stating that it was simply the occasional 
“romantic youth” that left for the FRG,72 but then later talking about the increasing number of 
people that either fled east or returned to the GDR after an ill-fated Western sojourn.  According 
to a June 1959 article, from 1958-1959 10,457 citizens left West Germany for the GDR with 
over 80% under the age of 35 many of whom were aiming “to avoid army service.”73  Skeptical 
of these repeated claims, Jim Meurice, a reader from Belgium, wrote in to express his disbelief.  
In response, GDR Review stated that the reason for this exodus was the “vastly different pattern 
of development in the two German states within recent years” and the emigrants were 
representative of the “growing fear of social and economic insecurity; increasing suppression of 
freedom of political opinion; atomic arming…military conscription; short-time and 
unemployment.”74 The greatly ironic mirroring of the FRG “other” in GDR Review thus came 
full force when discussing the relative appeal of the two German states, and in this zero-sum-
game the GDR worked to establish its legitimacy as a separate state even while nominally 
maneuvering for reunification. 
 True legitimacy is not a quantifiable objective; it requires acceptance in the international 
community.  In the climate of Cold War politics and the very real concerns of the West regarding 
repression in East Germany, the quest for legitimacy was seemingly Quixotic.  The 
representations of East Germans and their state in GDR Review, however, do illustrate a common 
narrative of moral superiority in the face of material inferiority.  The antifascist legacy 
established a baseline for the construction of socialism and the goal of achieving a legitimate 
state in the eyes of the international community.  The German question and reunification posed a 
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complicating factor that was ultimately resolved through mutual intransigence, but was utilized 
as a propaganda tool to advertise each side’s goals and adherence to democratic principles.  The 
goal of advertising a legitimate state did not disappear in 1961 with the Berlin Wall, but the 
rhetoric had to change to suit new needs and goals in light of increasingly complicated 
circumstances.
30 
 
Chapter 4 The Search for Recognition of the German Democratic Republic, 1961-1971 
 There were significant changes in GDR propaganda and foreign policy after 1961, but the 
messages were not so much different as they were modified to focus on altered goals.  For 
instance, the overt focus on indigenous antifascism in the GDR shifted to a clearer analysis of the 
divergence between the two German states and the goals of a “revanchist regime.”  Similarly, 
GDR Review maintained its focus on the social welfare programs of the GDR, but added a 
“humanitarian” focus to its program.  Finally, these distinct programs culminated in a campaign 
of identity presentation tailored to obtain recognition of the “legitimate” GDR through peaceful 
understanding under international law.  Practically, this meant a careful tailoring of the GDR’s 
identity as a state that was superior to its western neighbor, but also safely focused on human 
rights and participation in international organizations.  
 The rhetoric of antifascism did not disappear in 1961-1971, but it was incorporated into 
the broader discourse that justified the construction of the Berlin Wall.  This legacy of victory 
through the defeat of fascism was followed by the familiar (and not strictly accurate) removal 
from “every position of power and influence held by war criminals, militarists and big 
landowners in East Germany.”75  The discussion of the Wall did not enter in to GDR Review 
until 1962 and in this instance it was referred to as “controlling [the GDR’s] frontiers” to stop “a 
potential source of danger which might have sparked off a third world war.”  As the paths to a 
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reunification of Germany diverged, the confrontation was put into a binary of peace for the GDR 
and “the true traditions of German militarism” in the Federal Republic.76   
The Wall eventually adopted its own forms of justification through the prevention of 
“smugglers, spies, provocateurs, arsonists.”  GDR Review showed these groups as figures 
stopped by a simple “white painted line” dominating the border and juxtaposed armed West 
Germans and Americans in observation towers with the hopeful GDR in the distance.77  Further 
images of American soldiers treading on the line or West German mobs shouting and throwing 
stones at an unseen object served to delegitimize the protests of the West and emphasized the 
benevolent tolerance of the East Germans.78  This point was pushed further in 1964 when articles 
discussed how many West Berliners went to East Berlin for Christmas without any mention of 
East Berliners travelling in a similar fashion.79  The portrayal of the Wall in any form was 
actually a departure for GDR photography which was pushed away from publishing contentious 
photographs of uncomplimentary aspects of the GDR such as the Wall or the 1953 uprising.80  
This change in direction was likely due to the impossibility of denying the Wall’s existence and 
the necessity to diminish its imposing nature in Western imagination. 
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This reverse victimization through counter-narrative construction about the Wall reached 
a climax with the discussion of slain GDR NVA (Nationale Volksarmee) guardsmen on the 
border.  Guards such as Peter Göring and Reinhold Huhn, who were slain during botched border 
crossings by supposed West German ‘smugglers,’ that were often fleeing the GDR dictatorship, 
were memorialized as victims in a desperate battle to secure a dangerous border, a clear right of 
any sovereign nation according to the GDR Review.81  The twisted reversal of the victim 
narrative at the Berlin Wall focused on the few East German border guards killed (8 total to 
1989) and ignored the much greater loss of life of East German fugitives and others totaling 128 
lives to 1989.82  The Wall was a particular disaster for GDR legitimacy in this time period as 
two-thirds of the deaths at the Wall occurred from 1961-1969 (90 deaths).83 
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By the latter 1960s GDR Review instead began to focus on new challenges in Cold War 
Europe.  In 1968, GDR Review celebrated its success in gaining significant reader 
correspondence and their promises that they would work for the recognition of the GDR in their 
home countries.  Simultaneously, they were delighted that this success demonstrated “that [GDR 
Review’s] efforts to give a true picture 
of the socialist German Democratic 
Republic in our magazine are bearing 
fruit.”84 Despite the partial 
achievement of their goals, however, 
the GDR had still not obtained its 
sought-after recognition.  The 
Hallstein Doctrine was the shorthand term for the policy of the FRG ceasing diplomatic relations 
with any country that recognized the GDR due to its lack of free elections and resulting 
illegitimacy. The Hallstein Doctrine still stymied many of the GDR’s attempts at recognition and 
consequently the FRG was painted in an increasingly critical light.  For example, there was an 
article published, when first discussing the Prague Spring, which was entitled “Bonn’s Plans 
Were Frustrated.”  In this article, the “aggressive main powers of world imperialism, the USA 
and West Germany” had sprung their trap of “long-term infiltration of the European socialist 
countries” with “political, ideological and economic weapons” to “sap[ping] their strength and 
cause[ing] differences between them.”85  Similarly, Bonn was targeted as a hot bed for resurgent 
Nazism through articles about the neo-Nazi NPD (Nationale Demokratische Partei). GDR 
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Review claimed the fascist NPD was actually “in line with official policy” and was only held 
back from political prominence by an antifascist “political basis in the GDR.”86 Thus the GDR 
was presented as the essential and tolerant walled bulwark against the advance of fascists, 
smugglers, and provocateurs, which countered the narrative of the repressive wall and further 
bolstered this image with a humanitarian self-characterization. 
The social welfare programs emphasized in the first years of GDR Review did not 
disappear, but were instead accompanied by a modified emphasis on a humanist and free society.  
The split between the GDR and the FRG was made manifest by more than politics or militarism, 
but also culture.  For instance, the GDR claimed to have “become the nation’s trustee of its 
humanist heritage” with its task to “raise the whole cultural life of the Republic” as “a model to 
all progressive people in Germany” while also fostering “humanistic and progressive cultural 
elements, trends and groupings in West Germany.”87  The cultural cooption of Schiller and 
Goethe was thus paralleled with “plays and films…works of art that serve your [the GDR’s] 
state, your policy” into what the GDR termed a “humanist” German national tradition.  
Furthermore, daily life in the GDR was characterized as a society of caring, where people 
“realize that not even the best oil heating system can replace the human warmth which the citizen 
of the GDR is used to at home.”88 Objections of a dwelling-deprived populace notwithstanding, 
the humaneness and warmth of the socialist people of the GDR became increasingly central to its 
self-identity especially as it sought to neutralize Western hostility engendered by the Berlin Wall.  
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In the latter 1960s another narrative change took place when a focus on international 
humanitarianism developed.  Although it has often been presented as a purely post-Helsinki 
Accords transition, the GDR developed a human rights program in 1946 and “founded the 
Eastern Bloc’s only state-sponsored human rights organization in 1959.”89  First, the GDR 
demonstrated its commitment to human rights in tandem with the UN Resolution that declared 
1968 the International Year of Human Rights. To that end, the GDR government wanted all 
countries to “accede to those human rights conventions already in operation” such as those 
abolishing slavery, eliminating gender discrimination, prevention/punishment of genocide, and 
the end of racial discrimination.  Of course, these conventions were “embodied in the GDR 
Constitution and are observed to the letter in its legal practice” despite the realities of a harshly 
repressive dictatorship.90  Next, international humanitarianism was also utilized as a tool for the 
GDR to criticize Western actions. This criticism was first over differing conceptions of 
humanitarianism and then later over practices such as US and FRG involvement in the Vietnam 
War.  When GDR Prime Minister Willi Stoph contacted Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger, the latter replied, but did so by advancing the “’inalienable’ right of the Federal 
Republic to speak for the whole of Germany” and “generally parading as the custodian of 
‘humanitarian alleviations.”91 According to GDR Review, however, the GDR would “insist on 
the solution of” core issues such as “world-peace, security, good-neighbourliness and concrete 
proposals in this direction” all “in the name of humanitarianism.”92  Furthermore, the attempts of 
                                                           
89
 , Edward (Ned) Richardson-Little, “The Exploitation of Man by Man has Been Abolished: Dictatorship, Dissent, 
and Human Rights in East Germany, 1945-1990,” PhD diss., University of North Carolina: Chapel Hill, 2013. 
 
90
 GDR Rev., I, 1967, 29. 
 
91
 GDR Rev., XII, 1967, 36. 
 
92
 Ibid., 36. 
 
  36 
 
West Germans to adopt a “new eastern policy”93 was shown as merely the latest strategy of 
defeating the GDR from the June 1953 uprising and “bleeding the GDR white.”94 Finally, the 
GDR demonstrated solidarity with oppressed national peoples such as the North Vietnamese 
while also protesting American “massacres.”95  This stance of the GDR with North Vietnam did, 
in fact, serve as a major point of legitimacy and was also one of the rare propaganda points of the 
regime that much of the populace found worthwhile.96  Thus, the GDR redefined 
humanitarianism to suit their needs in order to reflect not only the benefits of a warm socialist 
domestic policy, but also to criticize a potentially volatile Western aggressiveness.  All of this, 
however, has been framed in constant relation to issues of recognition of the GDR’s legitimacy. 
As the root of the insecurity of this time period, diplomatic recognition of the GDR was a 
dominant theme from 1961-1971.  The construction of the Wall was also portrayed in the context 
of normal state relations, as Walter Ulbricht stated: “It is not a matter of a wall.  It is the fact that 
the German Democratic Republic is a sovereign state which has its perfectly normal frontiers, 
also frontiers with West Germany and West Berlin.”97 The wall and frontier became part and 
parcel of a broader push for international recognition explicitly on East German terms.  
Anecdotes such as former Vice President Nixon’s visit to East Berlin (and his border crossing) 
were used as examples of the “reality” that the West continually worked to deny.98  Population 
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transfers across the border also became matters of concern.  For instance, in an article entitled 
“Why do people move from the GDR to West Germany? Why do people from West Germany 
move to the GDR?,” GDR Review employed some false objectivity by only addressing those 
West Germans that came to the East99 and were photographed showing smiling children by the 
lake and parents who are content with their newly-acquired job security.100  GDR Review pushed 
this tactic even further when it addressed discontent within the GDR over not being able to travel 
to countries outside of the Eastern bloc.  Rather than attribute this to Cold War geopolitics or 
genuine fears of mass emigration, GDR Review claimed it was due to Western nations not 
recognizing the GDR and, by extension, GDR passports.101 Thus, recognition more generally 
became a means of overcoming the abnormality of the situation between the two Germanys, but 
also of shifting blame from the GDR to its Western antagonists who were increasingly shown to 
have no regard for peaceful relations in Europe. 
German coexistence and peace were two primary themes in GDR Review that involved a 
logical leap associating inter-German relations with the potential for nuclear destruction.  In 
other words, to ignore the potential threat of unstable relations in the center of Europe was to 
ignore the potential calamity of armed confrontation between Cold War powers. In a curious 
reversal of West German aims, the creation of diplomatic relations with the GDR was “of such 
far-reaching significance” due to the disagreements “so deliberately argued by Bonn.” According 
to the GDR, peace was threatened because the GDR did not exist as a legitimate state in the eyes 
of the West, and “whatever military action were taken against the GDR…would never be in the 
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nature of an aggression, it would never be anything of concern to the United Nations.”102  
Consequently, British Labour MPs, Arnold Gregory and William Wilson claimed that the GDR 
should be recognized in the context of détente, but that the GDR should not be made more 
insecure in its position so that “nothing is done to encourage the revanchist and neo-nazi trend in 
West Germany.”103  Simultaneously, the GDR was working to obtain full recognition by the UN 
as it would ensure “the securing of peace and relaxation of tension in Europe.”104  The idea 
therefore was to demonstrate not only a commitment to world peace but also to “fully accord 
with the principles and aims of the UN Charter and therefore qualify…for full membership of the 
UNO.”105  In other words, stability and recognition were essential for a peaceful Europe.  Much 
of the period of 1961-1971 involved the essential creation of a GDR counter-narrative to 
Western attacks.  
Olympic sports in the GDR served as a 
microcosm for its attempts to gain a legitimate standing 
in the international community.  The actions of a neutral 
body, such as the International Olympic Committee were 
often scrutinized to show that the FRG was the only 
obstacle to the GDR’s entry in to an international system 
of fair play. For instance, in an article “IOC Demands 
Clear Decision,” GDR Review stated that from now on “the IOC will award future Olympic 
summer and winter games only to countries whose governments grant entry permits to all 
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sportsmen.”106  In this period, due to the structures of the Olympic system, the GDR and the FRG 
competed on the same team from 1956-1964 and the competitive urge to outperform the West 
was often relegated to smaller events.107  For example, the GDR would celebrate victories such 
as the 1963 triumph of the GDR handball team over the FRG.108  However, even a unified 
German sports team could provoke comparison, as at Innsbruck where two of three gold and 
silver medals were won by athletes from the GDR.109  Finally, in 1964, the GDR gained their 
own Olympic team despite the contrary machinations of the FRG against them.110  The major 
triumph for the GDR occurred at the 1968 Mexico Olympics where the GDR received all manner 
of legitimate recognition through “true hospitality by observing the principles of equality, mutual 
respect and international friendship in the face of massive West German attempts to disrupt 
athletic harmony,”111 while also outperforming the FRG by a large margin.112  This success was 
particularly powerful because GDR, athletes’ success was meant to be viewed as the triumph of 
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socialism over a revanchist West,113 while the FRG remained confused about continued East 
German success despite clear economic and political superiority in the West.114  Even more 
importantly, sports were some of the few activities through which the state could gain positive 
international attention in their campaigns for recognition and legitimacy and still have its own 
populace tune in.115 
The disaster of the Berlin Wall and loss of citizens fleeing to the West damaged the 
GDR’s image and, with the goal of recognition, the GDR required a redemptive narrative. Thus, 
it redefined the Wall as a peaceful protective barrier, the FRG as increasingly fascist, and the 
GDR as a humanitarian state.  The peaceful prestige of Olympic success, as well as GDR 
independence from the FRG also worked to establish the GDR as a distinct state from its more 
powerful neighbor.  The goal of recognition was not achieved until the next period, but it was at 
this point that the internal evolution of socialism entered the fore. The reforms of Honecker did 
much to shift GDR identity and legitimacy from an explicit counter-narrative to a more positive 
construct.
                                                           
113
 Gunter Holzweißig, Diplomatie im Traininganzug: Sport als politisches Instrument der DDR in den 
innerdeutschen und internationalen Beziehungen, (München, Wien: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981), 10. 
 
114
 Young, 151. 
 
115
 Young, 153.  According to Young, “half of GDR television viewers claimed to watch only major sporting 
events.” 
41 
 
Chapter 5 Normalization and Challenge, 1972-1979 
Similar to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the rise of Erich Honecker to the position 
of General Secretary of the SED and de facto dictator of the GDR has been seen as a definitive 
event in GDR history.  Despite the major pushes from the GDR to be accepted into the UN, by 
1972 it remained an outsider in the international community.  This status gradually began to 
change however, due to the Basic Treaty of late 1972 between the GDR and FRG and the GDR’s 
admittance into the UN.  These achievements of recognition, and a new focus on interior 
conditions, altered the character of the GDR to a state with basic diplomatic security, but with 
fears of a discontented population at home.  To combat this, the SED poured great efforts into 
raising the amount of consumer goods produced in the GDR for its populace, emphasizing its 
gender egalitarianism, and its growing concern for environmental degradation. 
The German Question was, to the GDR, resolved by 1972 due to the simple fact that 
there were two German states.  In a speech by Honecker, he was emphatic that the “inviolability 
of the frontiers between the DDR and BDR” (German Federal Republic116) would be confirmed 
by the FRG.  Previously, this was made clear at the Eighth Congress of the SED which stated 
that “[b]etween the socialist DDR and the imperialist BDR there is no unity, and there can be no 
unity.”117  The harshness of this division was even further reinforced with images of Honecker 
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shaking hands with NVA troops amidst artillery pieces, which simultaneously served to 
emphasize the willing defense of the GDR while subverting the “peaceful coexistence” narrative 
of earlier years.  In December of 1972, GDR Review published an article “A Success for the 
Cause of Peace and Security” discussing the successful conclusion of the Basic Treaty with the 
FRG, as well as the achievement of membership 
in the United Nations Organization.  In this 
article, the treaty and membership in the UN 
were strong steps towards “normalizing the 
relations between the GDR and the Federal 
Republic” which was attributed to the work of 
the people of the GDR with their Western allies 
and their struggles for peace.118   
The achievements of basic relations and UN membership paved the way for 
the GDR to claim the creation of a new political climate.  This new phase shifted 
from the Cold War to “peaceful coexistence” which was “becoming more and more 
the norm for inter-state relations.”119  The Basic Treaty and UN membership also led 
to recognition by Western powers that aided the creation of favorable economic 
relations as well.120  The Cold War, however, was not over and the GDR still worked 
to demonstrate that the peace of this détente would not last unless paired with social 
security.  Thus, African women pictured in deplorable states were shown in an article juxtaposed 
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with content East Germans where “freedom, equality, dignity and rights” matter even to the 
starving people who lack the security of a generous welfare state such as the GDR.  This 
metaphor was also pushed to the West with accusations of racial intolerance.121  
With much of their goals of recognition in hand, the GDR then sought to foster its 
support at home through greater focus on the consumption of consumer goods in what was 
termed the “unity of social and economic policy”.  The goal in 1972 in the GDR became 
“everything for the welfare and happiness of the people, for the interests of the working class and 
the whole of the working population.”122  This improvement, however, was not to be 
implemented without “a new demand on the capabilities and initiative of the working people.”123  
In other words, new production demands and ingenuity would be required by the workers.  This 
refocus, emphasized for several issues, demonstrated an internal evolution of socialism, but it 
also involved a new juxtaposition with the West.  In an article, “The Moon and Murder,” GDR 
Review acknowledged the remarkable achievements of Apollo 16, but also displayed the US B-
52 bombers dropping explosives on Vietnam.  Both of these ventures, it was stated, were piloted 
by air force pilots that were used as evidence of a “cult of technology in the US” that has not 
solved social problems such as unemployment, slums, and racism.124  The GDR however, had 
focused its ingenuity and focus on improving the lot of workers and their welfare.  
Simultaneous with this increase in consumer welfare, the GDR began to emphasize the 
aspects of its “democracy” that showed it was a mature state committed to a functioning 
government and a content populace.  For example, the question from readers “What is the 
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Essence of Your Democracy and How Does it Work in Practice?” received an explanation of 
socialist democracy.  Socialist democracy, according to GDR Review involved a continuing 
increase of state power and planning, but also “the growth of creative activity by the working 
people.”125 Furthermore, these decisions were not simply made by upper government officials, 
but were instead “publicly discussed during their preliminary phases, thus enabling every 
individual to contribute his own suggestions and ideas.”126   
By emphasizing the nominally participatory aspects of their governing, the GDR could 
demonstrate their state’s legitimacy while also portraying how consumer-oriented production 
that increased standard of living (the generalized impression of the West) could, in fact, fit 
within the evolving broader socialist context of state planning and control if given the people’s 
support.  This popular consensus was pushed even further with the notion of a volunteer society.  
The “socialist personality” and “new human being” who emerged with the true adoption of 
socialism not only worked hard, but also did “voluntary work for society” involving working in 
the People’s Chamber, as executives in academic societies, or treasurers in trade unions.127 More 
than anything else, the people of the GDR were shown to have not only shifted their identity to 
become socialists, but also to have developed a genuine stake in a democratic welfare state. 
The group of people perhaps most targeted in this time period by GDR propaganda was 
women.  The GDR’s emancipatory rhetoric concerning women’s equality under socialism did 
not simply appear after 1972.  Up until that point there was a steady commentary on a variety of 
features of women’s experience including working, home life as a working mother, the 
housework day, and the notion of a female “surplus” in light of the death toll of the German male 
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population in the Second World War.  What changed in this period, however, was the degree to 
which women’s experiences were emphasized, and how equality received persistent focus 
despite earlier claims to its de jure and de facto (to an extent) existence.  The crux of this new 
argumentation involved a demonstration of socialist women’s equality as existing in fact, as 
opposed to “the purely formal right” that existed in Capitalist countries.  The Socialist-Capitalist 
binary was also fundamental to these claims of equality because the social pressures in the West 
often prevented women and mothers from their “right to take a job.”  GDR Review also claimed 
to be capable of making these judgments due to its former experience of a transition from 
capitalism to socialism where “many men were at first suspicious about the whole idea of 
equality for women.”128  Further claims to authority on this topic by GDR Review were made by 
interviewing many different women for these articles, if not actually having female authors write 
them.  The equality in the GDR thus involved “freeing women from the traditional burden of 
family and domestic duties” through state-funded crèches, workplace lunch services, and 
participation of men and children in the household.129 The paradox in this rhetoric, however, was 
as Dagmar Langenhan and Sabine Roß argued that “the rules associated with the ‘family and 
career model’ were focused on women, which meant that traditional gender roles and work 
patterns were not transformed, but instead, reinforced.”130 Simultaneously, the image of the 
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oppressed West German women entered the conversation as they were treated “as subordinate 
beings at work, in political life and in the family.”131  
More complicated markers of women’s equality such as the legalization of abortion and 
women’s status in higher positions of authority also received attention.  In the “Postscript to the 
Enquiry” on women’s equality, GDR Review confronted the challenging claim that women were 
not often promoted to higher positions or that they were forced to work by labor shortages in the 
GDR.  According to GDR Review, the reasons for this were simple: many women were not so 
concerned about individual progress or promotion and thus often did not reach higher levels in 
the GDR.132 However, women with lots of training often desired higher social status so they 
desired to keep working rather than confine themselves to traditional household roles.  This idea, 
claimed GDR Review, “invalidates the argument that material need compels women in the GDR 
to go out to work.”  The magazine acknowledged this also caused problems in the family due to 
“some old tenacious traditions and habits” despite “preconceived ideas suggesting that women 
were less suited for this or that kind of work,” but that these had largely been overcome.133 
Women in the GDR were thus presented as existing in a peculiar nexus of true equality, former 
capitalist prejudices, fulfilling work, and a lack of concern for their own progress.  
This curious and confused relationship concerning women’s role in the GDR was a key 
component in the GDR’s identity counter-narrative, but it lacked true convincing power due to 
its often contradictory nature.  In 1973, GDR Review also celebrated the March 9, 1972 law that 
legalized abortion.  The justification for this legalization fit within the broader scheme of 
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combining equality with social welfare as the state health care in the GDR also covered 
abortions.134  It was also something of a propaganda tool to race the FRG to the legalization of 
abortion and thus be able to present itself as the continuing heir to all progressive action in 
German history.  Ultimately, women in the GDR were presented as the beneficiaries of the 
positive direction of socialism and were used as a comparison in social freedom between the two 
German states.  
 
 
Another emerging trend in the GDR was to address 
growing concern over environmental degradation.  The 
remarkable amount of pollutants produced by GDR industrial 
and chemical production in tandem with the usage of 
predominantly soft brown coal had severely harmed the 
environment in the GDR.  To combat this knowledge, GDR 
Review produced a series of articles regarding the work to be 
done to preserve and clean the air, water and soil.135  The GDR 
framed their environmental problems (there was no use denying this) by first stating that all 
industrial societies have to contend with these issues, but also by shifting blame to a destructive 
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pre-socialist, uncaring capitalist industrialization, in other words “the GDR has to bear the 
burden of a sad legacy.”136  Simultaneous with these discussions, all of the images portrayed 
factories producing clouds of smoke, clean waterways, and images of corn fields, beaches, and 
the “recovery” of a lignite mine.  These contradictory images provided a scattered view of an 
environment suffering in the GDR, but also one that was on the mend with the government’s 
support.  The factory spewing smoke was paired with the truck carrying environmental 
inspectors and wrapped in a guilt-free narrative.   This narrative also celebrated the state’s role in 
controlling pollution to ensure public health while preserving the environment.  The GDR 
advocated international cooperation through the UN in protecting the environment, and further 
demonstrated its commitment to their programs.  The Environmental Conservation Law, of 
which the GDR was so proud, focused on a program of cooperation and vague “short term 
measures” that reduced “dust nuisance” from chemical factories.137   The new concerns of the 
1970s paired with the reassurance of recognition developed into an increase in concern over too 
much conciliation with the West that could gradually undo the efforts at differentiation in East 
Germany. When confronted with renewed Cold War tensions and an increasingly insolvent 
economy, the GDR had to once again resort to traditional narratives of antifascism, peace, and 
social welfare. 
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Chapter 6 Crisis and Dissolution in the 1980s 
 The three major concepts of the 1980s that represented the desired identity of the GDR, 
antifascism, social welfare, and peace/disarmament, were intertwined in the GDR.  Each of these 
contended with crises of economy and Cold War tension both within and outside of the GDR and 
was fundamental to the state.  Antifascism was both a counter-narrative to Western depictions of 
a dictatorial GDR and the foundation for a socialist Germany that claimed to have broken with 
the discredited German traditions of authoritarianism, militarism, and capitalism.  It legitimated 
the regime in the eyes of intellectuals through its legacy of resistance and departure from the 
National Socialist path.  The social welfare programs of the GDR were cultivated as a more 
“offensive”  and constructive narrative for the GDR that emphasized the care for citizenry, 
improvements in life conditions, and the brotherhood of workers in a socialist nation in 
juxtaposition to the horrors of the German experience of the first half of the twentieth century.  
Finally, peace, as a core goal in the GDR’s narrative of moral superiority, represented a clean 
break with German revanchism and the history of National Socialist aggression while displaying 
the “true” focus of the GDR, the welfare of its citizens.   
The rhetoric of antifascism in GDR Review during the early 1980s focused on 
juxtaposing the U.S. and the FRG to the GDR in reference to militarization and response to the 
existence of neo-fascism (Nazism).  One mode of comparison was the military-industrial 
complex in the U.S. as a motivator to war similar to the falsely-perceived power of German 
companies under Nazism.  This represented a continuation in the Marxist rhetoric that capitalism 
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drives wars, and US monopolies represent the new forms of IG Farben, etc.138  Due to its 
peaceful stance, the GDR and the greater Eastern bloc was presented as the victim of a resurgent 
and aggressive fascism in the West that an antifascist GDR must guard against. Similarly a major 
article series from the early 1980s, “The FRG Today,” repeatedly demonstrated the existence of 
fascism in West Germany as opposed to the clean, antifascist, GDR. Consequently, the FRG was 
presented as a haven for former (and possibly current!) fascists as juxtaposed with the other 
articles in GDR Review demonstrating the supposedly clean nature of the entirely antifascist 
GDR. GDR Review tried to appeal to audiences that had become aware of Jewish experiences 
during the Holocaust while remaining within the pre-existing official paradigm of an East 
German antifascist legacy. The atrocities committed on the Jewish community represented a 
particularly difficult scenario for traditional GDR antifascism, as “the holocaust raises troubling 
general questions, since it demonstrates that race hatred can supersede class struggle.”139   
  One article, entitled “The FRG Today: Full Scope for Organised Neo-Fascism,” 
discussed the toleration of the FRG for neo-Nazi and fascist organizations.  Next to the title was 
a Reichsadler, a German imperial eagle demonstrating the continuity of the FRG with 
Germany’s authoritarian past.  Next, a newspaper clipping from the October 14, 1977 issue of 
Deutsche National Zeitung was shown claiming that the burning of the Jews was a lie and asking 
if Hitler will come again.  Paired with the first line of the article: “The world public is watching 
with growing alarm the spreading proliferation of neo-nazi and openly fascist tendencies in the 
FRG,” this shows that the GDR was deliberately trying to present the FRG as increasingly 
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dangerous in this period as opposed to the antifascist GDR.140  The reality of skinhead youth 
movements within the GDR were not discussed because, with their oppositional opinions and 
violent activities against non-Germans in the GDR (such as third-world students studying at 
universities) they were not a factor in a narrative calculated for international appeal.141 
A major section of the article was about the FRG’s toleration of two new neo-nazi parties 
formed in 1980, the Nationalsozialistische Demokratische Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP – the same 
initials as the Nazi Party) and the Vokssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands/Partei der Arbeit. 
There was a picture of a rally of the NPD with a sign that the “whole” of Germany should exist. 
This, consequently, was a criticism of the official stance of the FRG regarding the GDR when 
juxtaposed with the position of neo-nazis. The organizations were termed “Neo-fascist” by GDR 
Review and were presented with pictures of young members holding flags at night (with a 
caption drawing a direct comparison to the Hitler Youth) next to photos of the American Nazi 
party in SA gear and a Jewish cemetery marred with spray-painted swastikas. The rest of the 
article discussed how these groups are allied across the Atlantic Ocean and this showed how the 
FRG, unlike the GDR, had not accepted the past despite how “great talk is made about ‘making 
amends’, ‘democratic education’ and a ‘constitutionally governed state’ in the Federal Republic 
of Germany.”142 
One example of a later 1980s antifascism article was titled “Is the far right ‘legitimate’?”  
In it, pictures of large protests with signs asking “January 30 ‘33/’89, Nothing learned?,” a 
woman swarmed by three police officers in a crowd and a man getting hit in the face by another 
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were all meant to demonstrate the renewed fascist violence in the FRG.  These photographs 
presented a clear division between the West German people, who wanted to recognize the past 
and eliminate neo-Nazis and the state police whose acts of violent oppression put down the 
demonstrations. This article questioned the legitimacy of the election of Republicans to some 
State Assemblies.  The article states that Republican groups drew young people and were based 
on attacking foreigners, Jews, and communists.  However, rather than this violent rhetoric, the 
Republicans on the far right (presented as neo-Nazis) were elected because they claimed to be 
able to solve the problems of “mass unemployment, the housing shortage, the education crisis, 
the lack of training possibilities, drug abuse and crime.”  Furthermore the article stated that neo-
Nazism was still a major issue that could not be solved unless the FRG adopted the same model 
of antifascism promoted by the GDR.143  The images thus showed that the West Germans were 
unhappy with the election, but paired with the text, made the reader wonder if the West Germans 
were in fact unhappy with their living conditions in the “increasingly deplorable state of affairs 
in the FRG and West Berlin.”  The images of state repression paired with textual references to 
the FRG’s defense of neo-Nazism evoked the image of a Federal Republic lacking democratic 
legitimacy (a mirroring effect of the GDR’s goals for legitimacy). In the later 1980s antifascism 
was less confrontational in GDR Review.  This lessening of confrontation did not mean that the 
GDR abandoned its rhetoric.  Instead, antifascism was gradually brought into relation with the 
social welfare and peaceful motives of the GDR in juxtaposition with the FRG.  Furthermore, 
articles on antifascism in general became less common and significantly shorter. 
In the early 1980s the construction of more and new housing was a major issue in GDR 
society.  In a society of social welfare and care for the common man, a lasting housing shortage 
thirty years after the founding of the GDR was a core threat to GDR legitimacy. To combat this 
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impression, GDR Review argued housing demand was increasing too fast due to “the desire of 
many, including older people, for high-quality living accommodation. Today people are less 
satisfied than they were with what their parents or grandparents thought of as more than 
adequate.” 144  In response, the GDR discussed how “hundreds of thousands, even millions, of 
GDR citizens will be able to move into a new home over the next five years.”145  One of the 
major issues with the housing campaign initiated at the Eighth Party Congress of 1971 was the 
restoration of increasingly run-down buildings in the older town centers.   
One article entitled “A New Lease of Life for Old Houses: Plans and Problems of 
Socialist Construction in the GDR” examined that exact problem in the town of Erfurt.  Two 
photographs were placed on the front page of the article to demonstrate the construction process. 
One showed a crumbling brick framework and a 
partially deconstructed building while on the other 
page a very pleasant residential neighborhood with 
restored facades was presented.146  The article stated 
that the delay in the housing program that began in 
1971 was due to the need to create a “viable 
economy” and to erase the legacy of capitalism, 
such as “the housing shortage, inadequate sanitary facilities…and the dilapidated and dingy 
dwellings in many residential areas.”147  Other photographs in the article showed outdoor 
construction of bathroom extensions added on to the buildings or the courtyards inside 
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prefabricated houses.  The large and emphasized photograph at the end of the article showed the 
restored city center of Erfurt that was “modernised” in the 1970s.  This photograph showed 
mostly attractive buildings with their traditional facades still largely intact.148 The article 
presented the GDR building campaign as having made great progress and was aimed at a very 
positive forward trajectory.  However, prefabricated housing was much cheaper than renovation 
and the need to take a “realistic approach” to the modernization hinted at issues with restoring 
the older buildings.  A particularly telling phrase was that each house needed to be “waterproof 
and warm…have a bathroom and toilet and the structural fabric of the building must be 
guaranteed for the next 20 or 30 years.”149  The GDR was primarily concerned with basic 
housing and simple restorations, which often caused issues with maintaining historical facades or 
keeping pace with the rising standards of the inhabitants.  Lore Uhlmann mentioned this in her 
reflective editorial on the fall of the Berlin Wall when she discussed how GDR Review failed to 
present the “increasing dilapidation of buildings, particularly in the old town centres of which 
only a few have been restored.”150 
The building program in the later 1980s adopted a much different tone from the 
triumphalist and forward-looking representations of the early 1980s.  For instance, in an article 
entitled “The Path of Stones: Building in Rostock,” photographs of prefabricated buildings 
dominated much of the article with only a limited amount of depiction of the restored facades of 
the town center.151  According to the article, the building of many homes quickly came at the 
cost of “the neglect of buildings in the town centre.  Necessary repairs were postponed.  This was 
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unavoidable.”152 Furthermore, parts of the town center had to be demolished and were beyond 
saving.  One small photograph showed a very run-down neighborhood with peeling and stained 
facades that was set up to be destroyed and rebuilt.  Thus, the presentation of Rostock was of a 
work in progress that has caused sacrifices in some areas, rather than a simple solution.  This 
complicates the earlier version presented by GDR Review and is representative of a softening of 
the hard ideological propaganda of the early 1980s. 
The discussion of environmental protection and treatment in the GDR in the later 1980s 
was particularly interesting.  One article, named “Spring Cleaning a River Bed,” discussed the 
actions of a League of Culture group in Erfurt that decided to clean the Little Gera a rivulet in a 
former foundation pit. The photographs accompanying the article alternated between showing 
pleasant nature scenes marred by trash and young people gathering garbage and walking down 
the concrete beds of the rivulet.  These photographs showed a somewhat barren landscape with 
lots of concrete, industrial machinery in the background, and even some prefabricated 
housing.153  The tone of the article was celebratory and playful, discussing how a group of 
responsible young adults (80 people) gathered to clean the rivulet and encountered various 
civilian refuse that the article claimed was “evidence of some near-by residents having 
renounced their responsibility for a piece of environment before their front-doors by using the 
river as a dump.”154   The article presented the group’s activities as a contractual commitment 
made necessary because mechanized cleaning was too difficult and paid manual cleaning too 
expensive.  Thus, the Society for Nature and Ecology, a branch of the League of Culture, assisted 
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with the cleaning by volunteering with the local city council to argue their case for cleaning and 
planting additional trees.155  The pictures and article told an important story, because the 
environment was a major concern of large groups in the GDR that were dissatisfied with the 
pollution caused by heavy industry.  The article showed an official group with largely young 
members channeling their passions into a safe and non-critical (of the state) activity.  
Furthermore, the article’s emphasis on civilian refuse and the necessity of environmental 
protection on the individual level showed that the state was not responsible for the destruction of 
the environment.  As was seen before, the environmental degradation of the GDR was due to its 
heavy industry developed over the course of time and the increasingly deplorable state of the 
environment eventually became a core part of the dissent against the SED as crises mounted in 
the 1980s. 
In stark contrast to this portrayal is another article entitled “Natural Resources” that 
showed a slag dump right next to a bush in bloom.  The harsh juxtaposition and jarring nature of 
the picture was not matched by the article.  Instead, the article discussed that although the 
destructive nature of industry on its environment was unfortunate, the resources extracted were 
necessary.  Indeed, as the Soviet Union decreased oil deliveries to the Eastern bloc, GDR 
reliance on domestic resources became even more extreme.  Thus, the prime resource the article 
discussed was lignite (brown coal) that was an essential energy source for East Germans 
throughout the country’s existence.156 The brown coal was much more harmful to the 
environment than coal of superior quality or Soviet oil, which was harshly demonstrated in the 
photograph.  In fact, it was this brown coal which produced large amounts of sulfur dioxide that 
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caused acid rain and respiratory problems for GDR citizens. These negative effects could have 
been limited through filtering, but was not due to overwhelming focus on production standards in 
the GDR rather than on health and welfare in the 1980s.157 The article focused instead on how 
the areas could be reclaimed and used for farms later or turned in to recreation areas such as the 
Senftenberg Lake area.158  The environmental destruction was thus couched in a more positive 
impression of a custodial state working to preserve its resources.  This narrative related to a 
broader identity and demonstrated community involvement in cleaning and preserving nature, 
which was constructed to counter known environmental issues in the GDR that despite obvious 
degradation were kept officially as state secrets.159 
The most frequent and recurring topics of GDR Review in the early 1980s were peace and 
disarmament.  The specific topics varied, but all tended to be in the categories juxtaposing social 
welfare vs. rearmament, fears of the end of détente, and nuclear disarmament.  The GDR 
presented itself as very much in favor of peace and continually mentioned their desire to prevent 
a war from starting on German soil ever again. To this end, GDR Review continually emphasized 
its support of the increasingly powerful peace movement in Western Europe and the FRG 
specifically.  GDR Review portrayed these various topics within the umbrella of peace through 
specific article series such as “In the Name of Life Stop the Arms Race,” etc. but also with 
“news” coverage of global protests over NATO placement of medium-range nuclear weapons in 
the FRG and the development of the neutron bomb. 
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 An interesting recurring piece in GDR Review displayed the cost of the Cold War and 
rearmament through the expense of individual military weapons and their monetary equivalent in 
social and economic goods.  Within each of these segments there was a picture showing first the 
American or West German military product, then a picture of a social good that those funds 
could sustain.  For instance, one article showed a KC-10A transport and refueling plane that cost 
thirty-four million dollars to build or enough for 2,720 jobs in the health services and displayed 
the daily cost of rearmament as more than 500,000 million dollars yearly.160  Similarly, an Alpha 
Jet (FRG fighter) cost twenty million D-Marks, or enough for 180 three-room flats.  The article 
continued to discuss how the company profiting from this cost was Dornier, which “was one of 
the main producers of bombers for the fascist militarists.”161  The costs of rearmament and 
“aggression” were thus presented as directly counter to the social welfare advocated by the 
peaceful GDR, who instead of paying for militaries builds schools.  No mention was made of the 
GDR military contribution to the Warsaw Pact; instead the Soviet Union was portrayed as the 
defender of Eastern Europe.  The GDR gained additional fuel to criticize the NATO military 
modernization campaign beginning in 1979 and in to the 1980s due to the Western public’s 
protest against this dramatic increase in war materials.  These conventional weapons and 
materials were often as unpopular, if less publicized, than the placement of the medium-range 
nuclear missiles, the SS-20s.162 
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 The peace movement of the 1980s emphasized the necessity of renewing negotiations, 
stopping the neutron bomb, removing medium-range missiles from the FRG, and on finding 
ways to renew détente.  In one article entitled “for a Secure Peace – Against NATO’s Intensified 
Arming,” GDR Review began using the rhetoric of “Europe” to demonstrate a common identity 
separate (for the FRG and Western Europe) from the USA.  To that end, GDR Review chronicled 
local meetings of citizens declaring “we will devote our strength to forcing the repeal of the 
ominous NATO missile decision, which threatens the lives not only of all peoples in Western 
Europe [sic].”163  The focus of the peace campaigns depicted in this article was the US and 
NATO’s deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe.  The photographs in the article 
emphasized the protests in the FRG in Potsdam and Bonn. Protesters criticized the stationing of 
US rockets in Europe and advocated for peace through both conventional and nuclear 
disarmament.  These photographs showed large groups of people from the very young children 
to elderly West Germans.164  Interestingly, the GDR emphasized these spontaneous protests in 
the FRG and Western Europe, but made no mention of the pre-existing Soviet medium-range 
missiles that had been stationed in Eastern Europe in the mid-1970s.165  According to Thomas 
Rochon, the peace movements in the early 1980s in Western Europe did, in fact, criticize the 
placement of Soviet missiles in central Europe, but the majority of the demonstrations were 
arranged “in an unsuccessful effort to persuade their governments to reverse their decisions.”166  
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The large protests which occurred throughout Western Europe often proposed destabilizing 
questions about maintaining membership in NATO and the continuing validity of the Cold War 
alliance system.167 
 In contrast to the unofficial West German protests, the GDR sponsored specific peace 
demonstrations against the US nuclear expansion to Western Europe.  An article commemorating 
World Peace Day in the GDR in 1981 entitled “Halt the NATO Warmongers! Stop US Nuclear 
Arms Escalation!,” was accompanied by numerous photographs showing a march for peace, 
disarmament, and the end of neutron 
bomb research.  Young children of the 
FDJ (Free German Youth) made posters 
and sung in a concert for peace, while 
more photos showed workers meeting 
to discuss what they can do to advocate 
peace.  The text declared that the 
Soviets had continually offered peace 
and disarmament options to the FRG, but were rejected. 168  These September 1st demonstrations 
showed that the people “expressed their contentment at being able to live in a socialist state in 
which the maintenance of peace and the social well-being of all citizens are the top priorities.”169  
No mention was made of any unofficial peace movements within the GDR.  Thus, the unofficial 
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nature of the protests in the FRG and Western Europe was of particular significance because it 
demonstrated that the West German people felt isolated from their government that supported the 
stationing of the US Pershing missiles, while the GDR preferred peace and the welfare of its 
citizens in official demonstrations.  
 The late 1980s continued the trend of peace demonstrations in the FRG in juxtaposition 
to the peaceful intentions of the Soviets and the GDR.  In an article published concerning the 
West German protests prior to President Ronald Reagan’s visit to West Berlin on June 12, 1987 
entitled “‘Freedom and Peace’ – As They See It” West Germans were shown protesting nuclear 
weapons, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars).  An interesting series of photographs 
showed first a peaceful demonstration, then riot police attacking piles of unarmed civilians, and 
finally a man being carried away in a stretcher towards an ambulance.  The article stated that 
most West Berliners want peace and disarmament, but “those who are normally so quick to 
preach or dictate to others on questions of freedom and democracy found this democratic 
expression of the people’s will most unwelcome” and sent police in to break up the 
demonstration.170 The harsh repression of the people’s desire for peace in the FRG was even 
more forcefully emphasized given the speech of President Reagan that “called into question the 
existing state boundaries in Europe.”171  Ironically, the GDR’s continued coverage of these 
protests in Western Europe opened themselves up to pacifist criticism and, as the crises mounted, 
“caught between its pacifist rhetoric and militarist practice, the SED reacted nervously.”172 
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 The 1980s in the GDR were a period of some of the great heights of GDR legitimacy as 
well as a confrontation with some of its greatest challenges.  The increasing closeness with West 
Germany (Annäherung) despite the increased tensions of the Cold War threatened the 
demarcation of a distinct German state that the ruling Communist Party in Germany had worked 
to achieve (Abgrenzung).  Antifascism once again rose as a powerful differentiating factor in 
East German rhetoric even as the social welfare promises of the 1970s gradually paled in 
comparison to the wealth of the GDR’s western neighbor.  Even the impression of the GDR as 
the peaceful German state began to lose legitimate standing.  All of these features culminated in 
an increasingly desperate attempt to develop both a defensive counter-narrative to the crises in 
the GDR as well as an offensive narrative against fascism and militarism in the FRG, but showed 
a gradually evolving socialism that could no longer maintain an existence that lacked popular 
support and Soviet backing as the revolutions of 1989 shocked the world. East German identity 
had been created in an ideal form, but it had not convinced its own people or the world 
community of its legitimacy, and, due in large part to the crises of the 1980s, the GDR fell.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 The German Democratic Republic was a highly conflicted state.  This simultaneously 
dictatorial and welfarist state produced an array of representations of an official identity for a 
society that lacked clear legitimacy. Cynicism towards any claim made in a publication such as 
GDR Review would have been remarkably easy.  However, a more critical examination of these 
identity representations produces meaning within these official productions that help to identify a 
much broader trend in GDR history.  Ultimately, the GDR aspired to have an internationally 
legitimate and economically thriving antifascist welfare state of socialists living in peace.  To 
achieve this goal, the GDR produced publications of cultural diplomacy, such as GDR Review, 
that presented a particular East German identity through a defensive counter-narrative to Western 
conceptions of the GDR and an offensive and idealized presentation of socialist society. 
However, this publication and identity narratives “painted a picture of the GDR which did not 
encompass all aspects of the reality.”173  These frequent misrepresentations or alterations 
presented a more perfect GDR in a narrative tailored for international public appeal. 
The four developmental periods used in this analysis reflect common divisions within 
GDR history. This chronological approach offers a developmental understanding of an official 
GDR identity through a dual-process of a “defensive” counter-narrative to the presentation of the 
GDR coming from the West and an “offensive” narrative of a developing socialism.  Perhaps the 
best way to understand the relationship between these “offensive” and “defensive” narratives is 
through a mirroring process. More concretely, the East German counter-narrative often mirrored 
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the Federal Republic in a Cold War context by responding to issues that would have been 
known in the West, such as the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Prague Spring, the repression 
of religion, and one-party control and seeking to re-narrate their pre-existing Western 
presentation to make the GDR seem better.  This mirroring process, however, was not simply 
one-sided.  Instead the GDR looked to the FRG to find ways to shift its own identity narrative to 
be seen as more progressive, even while also re-interpreting less favorable events in its own state 
and bloc to seem like Western sabotage or normal events. For instance, anti-fascism could serve 
both an offensive and defensive purpose in the German “mirror.” On the one hand, anti-fascism, 
as a core belief of the GDR, established at least a baseline of legitimacy as it attempted to 
demonstrate a clear break with the Nazi past in a new society.   On the other hand, by accusing 
the FRG of maintaining fascist influence the GDR worked to discredit antagonistic claims made 
by the West against the East and diminish the immediate Western association of the two German 
dictatorships.  The mirror ultimately shattered as the GDR began to approach economic failure 
and a receding Soviet Union retreated to its own troubled state.  East Germans, who had long ago 
understood their material deficit vis-a-vis their Western counterparts, recognized their own lack 
of personal political identification with the regime, its narrative, and ultimately their nation.  
In its early stages, GDR Review portrayed their original legitimatory narrative of 
comparative anti-fascism, the construction of a benevolent welfare state, and the GDR as a 
“normal” state among modern nations.  Later, from 1961-1971, the GDR refocused to campaign 
for recognition by other states simultaneous with the complications of the Berlin Wall and 
increasingly confrontational Cold War.  To that end, the GDR promulgated a “defensive” 
narrative of FRG antagonistic provocation, and an “offensive” narrative about the morally 
superior socialist society.  Supposedly, the GDR belonged as a legitimate member of the 
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international community due to its adherence to international conventions and a dedication to 
peaceful coexistence. Next, from 1972-1979, the GDR felt increasingly normal and secure 
having obtained recognition from many Western nations, and continued to develop its narrative 
of moral superiority to the FRG through women’s equality and environmental protection while 
integrating economic aims of improving the production of consumer goods and leisure time.  
Finally, in 1980-1989 the GDR was confronted with increasingly severe crises including 
economic struggle and a renewed Cold War.  To combat these scenarios, GDR Review worked to 
rekindle the antifascist flame of earlier periods and emphasize its peaceful aims as it worked to 
provide for its people through standard of living increases.   
Many of the above themes maintained some form of presence throughout the course of 
the magazine, but the developmental structure shown here focuses on their relative weight and 
the theme’s particular usage within broader goals that the SED had for their own legitimacy 
through representations of their state’s and people’s identity.  The GDR craved legitimacy both 
to maintain its own existence in the international world, but also as a means to assure a peaceful 
Europe and world. Both Germanys faced a unique burden during the Cold War due to their 
placement at the center of the international divide.  If war were to break out, the GDR knew it 
would be fought on German soil. 
The stakes were high for East Germany and a redeeming narrative construction was 
essential to garner some degree of Western support.  They sought to establish a legitimate 
separate identity in juxtaposition with its more rich and powerful neighbor within the greater 
context of a polarizing Cold War.  The claims towards representations of identity made in the 
various sections of this paper cannot sum up the lived experiences of GDR citizens, their daily 
reality, or even the “message” of the state in its entirety. However, it can begin to speculate that 
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the nearness of the FRG, not only geographically through kinship and media, but also in the 
mirroring effect in the creation of a GDR counter-narrative of legitimacy prevented any kind of 
clear separation between the two Germanys. Indeed, one of the great ironies, perhaps, of the 
“better Germany” is that it had achieved so many of its goals of recognition and established 
relations with its estranged Western counterpart even as it began to fall apart.174   
It is fair to speak of East German identity and legitimacy in terms of failure, but it is a 
legacy of failure that maintains its relevance in German history as the still, comparatively, 
backward Eastern regions confront the realities of their historical experience.   Ostalgie certainly 
glosses over the dictatorial aspects of the GDR, but its memory is often that of more pluralized 
individual counter-narratives or of alternatives to the often crass consumerism or dehumanized 
capitalism of the West.  One should never forget the Stasi, the murders on the Berlin Wall, or the 
degrading grind of a life lacking true freedom, but, one should accept that, perhaps, there was 
something in the GDR worth remembering, even if only as a concrete example of an attempt to 
establish socialism as the great alternative to liberal democracy.  Indeed, as the debate rages on 
in modern Germany over identity and political direction, it becomes important to remember the 
ambivalent legacy of the German Democratic Republic and to avoid assuming utter irrelevance 
in failure and complete correctness in triumph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
174
 Sigrid Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft: zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR, 
1945-1989, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992). 
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